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UNENUMERATED POWER AND THE RISE OF
EXECUTIVE PRIMACY
Cheng-Yi Huang
Abstract: This article argues that contemporary syndromes of constitutional
dysfunction do not solely stem from the failures of the controlling executive power. Rather,
the tendency of chief executives’ appropriation of power is largely due to the fact that the
institutional logic of executive power makes them do so. To govern, the chief executive
needs to run the government with power, either political or constitutional. These powers
are not always enumerated in the constitution, but would still be regarded as constitutional.
This paper argues that the idea of taming unenumerated executive powers by definite
constitutional language and text is mostly futile. Drawing from recent cases of
constitutional controversies in Japan, Taiwan, and Poland, this article suggests that
unenumerated powers which cannot be checked by constitutional mechanisms are the cause
of the expansion of executive primacy in constitutional democracies. Following the case
studies, this article analyzes the nature and problems of unenumerated powers of the
executive. Building on the taxonomy proposed by Louis Fisher, the article argues that
unenumerated powers are analogous to the “implied powers” in Fisher’s discussion. It must
be affiliated with formal constitutional authority, but its scope would spontaneously expand
if there were no sensible constraints on the use of unenumerated powers. Political actors
take advantage of the fuzziness of unenumerated powers as a means of expanding their
power. In democratic systems, the judicial branch is usually called upon to resolve
boundary issues. As such, populist politicians often seek to control the court immediately
after taking office, which in order to temper this threat, and ultimately this action
contributes to the re-emergence of executive primacy.
Cite as: Cheng-Yi Huang, Unenumerated Power and the Rise of Executive Primacy, 28
WASH. INT’L L.J. 395 (2019).

I.

INTRODUCTION: AUXILIARY PRECAUTION AGAINST
POWER?

THE

EXECUTIVE

There are two conceptions of executive power: first, executive power
should be confined, and second, executive power should flourish.1 The first
is built on the fear of power being concentrated in the hands of the executive


Associate Research Professor, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. I would like to thank Professors Yasuo
Hasebe, Keigo Komamura, Toru Mori, Masahiro Sogabe, George Shishido, Mayu Terada, and Sota Kimura
for their careful explanation and comments on Prime Minister Abe’s initiatives for constitutional
amendments in Japan. Justices Stanisław Biernat, Andrzej Wróbel, and Marek Zubik of the Polish
Constitutional Tribunal offered insightful information during my field trip to Poland in 2016. Professors Lech
Garlicki and Mirosław Wyrzykowski provided extremely helpful guidance. Adam Oleksy, Tzung-yuan Lee,
Fang-yu Liu, and Junkai Chang have contributed invaluably to this article as research assistants. This paper
was presented in the workshop on the Resurgence of Executive Primacy in the Age of Populism at Academia
Sinica, June 2018. I thank all the participants’ comments and questions. All errors remain my own. Contact:
chengyi@sinica.edu.tw
1
Margit Cohn, Tension and Legality: Towards a Theory of the Executive Branch, 29 CAN. J.L. &
JURIS. 321, 321 (2016).
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branch, while the second avoids fragmenting executive power. 2 Both
approaches are aimed towards promoting the public welfare, but the way in
which the executive may achieve this goal differs greatly from one to the other.
In recent years, there has been growing concern about the expansion of
executive power in countries across the globe and worries about populist
politicians maliciously maximizing the power of the executive to advance
personal political interests and, consequently, paralyze democratic institutions.
In a democratic polity, debate over the proper role of executive power is
doomed to be circuitous. On the one hand, voters usually expect political
candidates to render electoral promises after stepping into office, which
signifies a potent and capable executive power. On the other, the party who
lost the election strives to confine the executive power as much as they can,
since most of the ruling party’s policies go against their agenda and interests.
Therefore, the use and control of executive power is a tug of war where one
side seeks to maximize its functionality and the other side endeavors to
minimize it.
However, the tension between maximalism and minimalism cannot be
reduced to merely a conflict between the abuse of power and the rule of law.
In fact, there is no doctrine in constitutional law or administrative law
preventing leaders and governments from doing their job. For example,
Article 2, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution provides the president the duty
and power to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” 3 In a
parliamentary system like Japan, its Constitution also bestows powers on the
Prime Minister to “submits bills, reports on general national affairs and
foreign relations to the Diet and exercises control and supervision over various
administrative branches.”4 Apparently, presidents and prime ministers enjoy
constitutional powers to carry out law and policies. The rule of law does not
require that everything the executive has done should have been expressly
mentioned in law or delegated by the legislative branch. 5 The traditional
2

The representative work of the second school is ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE
EXECUTIVE UNBOUND (2010). The first school is well represented in BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND
FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010).
3
U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3.
4
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 72 (Japan).
5
This is best illustrated by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Chevron v.
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Justice Stevens wrote for the court, “When a court reviews an agency's
construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
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doctrine of ultra vires essentially demands the government rule with
legitimacy and, therefore, combines the elements of legitimacy with legality.6
In everyday administration, discretion and deliberation are common features
of modern government, which requires dialogic interaction among different
constitutional branches. 7 Checks and balances, therefore, mean that
democracy should be guarded with the spirit of vigilance rather than the
specter of abhorrence. In Federalist Paper No. 51, James Madison wrote:
In framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable
the government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt,
the primary control on the government; but experience has taught
man-kind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.8
Therefore, to attribute the rise of “executive tyranny” or “imperial presidency”
to the maximalist conception of executive power is a misunderstanding, which
confuses democratic foundation of modern government with rule-bound
government.9

necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.” Id. at 842–43. Meanwhile, Adrian Vermeule, an administrative law professor at
Harvard, also noted, “The internal legal argument is that the power to fill in the details is an indispensable
element of what ‘executive’ power means; that to execute a law inevitably entails giving it additional
specification, in the course of applying it to real problems and cases. General legislative lawmaking can never
go all the way down, as it were, to the actual facts of particular cases.” See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S
ABNEGATION 53 (2016).
6
According to Trevor R. S. Allan, although A.V. Dicey’s formulation of ultra vires doctrine seems
to create a tension between legislative supremacy and the rule of law, Dicey also claimed that “Powers,
however extraordinary, which are conferred or sanctioned by statute, are never really unlimited, for they are
confined by the words of the Act itself, and, what is more, by the interpretation put upon the statute by the
judges.” T.R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE RULE OF LAW 13–14 (2001).
Therefore, ultra vires actually combines both “legitimacy” (parliamentary sovereignty) and legality (the rule
of law or the internal morality of law). See id. at 201. In the same vein, Sir John Laws once noted, “the rule
of law is a necessary condition for the exercise of democratic power since, without it, democracy’s own
dictates, which must include the decision-maker’s loyalty to the statute which is the democratic source of his
authority, are sand not stone.” See Sir John Law, Wednesbury, in THE GOLDEN METWAND AND THE CROOKED
CORD 183, 195 (Christopher Forsyth & Ivan Hare eds., 1998).
7
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, 191 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1992).
8
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 269 (James Madison), (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2012).
9
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule use the emergency power to illustrate a marginalist conception of
executive power. According to them, there is no point of Pareto efficiency on the curve of the security-liberty
tradeoff. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE
COURTS (2007).
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Nevertheless, some scholars argue that presidents’ direct control of
bureaucracy undermines the stability of constitutional democracy. 10 Some
indicate that the majority party’s court-packing strategy paves the way for
“dismantling constitutional checks on arbitrary power.” 11 Some have even
coined a new term, “constitutional hardball,” as the cause of constitutional rot,
which describes the tactic of politicians stretching or defying conventional
political practices or unspoken rules of politics in order to derogate the health
of the constitutional system. 12 Under this framework, the executive again
becomes the focus of discussions regarding constitutional dysfunction.
However, this time it is not related to institutional choice like parliamentary
or presidential systems during the third wave democratization almost thirty
years ago.13 At that time, prominent political scientists like Juan Linz claimed
that presidentialism is prone to corruption and unstable politics.14 However,
more and more studies have shown that the difference between
parliamentarism and presidentialism is not a key factor in the collapse of
democracy.15 Parliamentary systems like that of Poland or Hungary have also
fallen prey to authoritarian resurgence.16

10

Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 78, 148
(2018). This follows the almost thirty-years debates over unitary executive power in the United States. See
e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1155 (1992); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); Mark Tushnet, A Political Perspective on the Theory of the
Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 313 (2010).
11
Wojciech Sadurski, How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist
Backsliding (Sydney Law School, Research Paper No. 17, 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3103491.
12
Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 (2004). See also Jack
M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 101,
106–10 (Graber, Levinson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2018) (Balkin argues, “[b]y playing too much hardball,
enhancing political polarization, demonizing their opposition, and attempting to crush those who stand in
their way, political actors risk increasing and widening cycles of retribution from their opponents. This may
lead to deadlock and a political system that is increasingly unable to govern effectively . . . [and] undermining
or destroying norms of political fair play and using hardball tactics to preempt political competition may
produce a gradual descent into authoritarian or autocratic politics.”).
13
JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION:
SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 143 (1996). See also Bruce Ackerman,
The New Separation of Powers, 103 HARV. L. REV. 633, 638 (2000).
14
Tom Ginsburg, Jose Antonio Cheibub & Zachary Elkins, Beyond Presidentialism and
Parliamentarism, 44 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 515, 518 (2013).
15
See Maciej Bernatt & Michał Ziółkowski, Statutory Anti-Constitutionalism, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J.
487 (2019); Gábor Attila Tóth, Breaking the Equilibrium: From Distrust of Representative Government to
an Authoritarian Executive, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 317 (2019).
16
See Gabor Halmai, A Coup Against Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Hungary, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 243–256 (Mark A. Graber et al. eds., 2018); Wojciech Sadurski,
Constitutional Crisis in Poland, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS?, supra.
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This article argues that contemporary syndromes of constitutional
dysfunction do not solely stem from the failures of the controlling executive
power. Rather, the tendency of chief executives’ appropriation of power is
largely due to the fact that the institutional logic of executive power makes
them do so. To govern, the chief executive needs to run the government with
power, either political or constitutional. These powers are not always
enumerated in the constitution but would still be regarded as constitutional.
Justice Frankfurter first articulated the existence of unenumerated executive
powers in his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
arguing: “[T]he powers of the President are not as particularized as are those
of Congress. But unenumerated powers do not mean undefined powers. The
separation of powers built into our Constitution gives essential content to
undefined provisions in the frame of our government.”17 Meanwhile, when
Justice Jackson famously penned the “twilight zone” doctrine in Youngstown,
he also admitted that, “I have heretofore, and do now, give to the enumerated
powers the scope and elasticity afforded by what seem to be reasonable,
practical implications, instead of the rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire
textualism.” 18 This paper argues that the idea of taming unenumerated
executive powers by definite constitutional language and text is mostly futile.
Idolatry of separation of powers cannot solve the problems surrounding
contemporary syndromes of constitutional dysfunction. Many of the
unenumerated powers are essential to the maintenance of the day-to-day
operation of government. However, unenumerated powers also create a “grey
hole” in the political-legal sphere.19 In a nutshell, it helps the executive, but it
also blurs the line of the executive power.20 Its endless and gradual expansion
is the real problem of contemporary constitutional crisis.

17

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952). However, Justice Frankfurter
adopted an approach of judicial minimalism to deal with the unenumerated executive powers. According to
his opinion, “The issue before us can be met, and therefore should be, without attempting to define the
President's powers comprehensively. I shall not attempt to delineate what belongs to him by virtue of his
office beyond the power even of Congress to contract; what authority belongs to him until Congress acts;
what kind of problems may be dealt with either by the Congress or by the President, or by both, what power
must be exercised by the Congress and cannot be delegated to the President. It is as unprofitable to lump
together in an undiscriminating hodgepodge past presidential actions claimed to be derived from occupancy
of the office as it is to conjure up hypothetical future cases.” Id. at 597 (citation omitted).
18
Id. at 640.
19
DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 3 (2006).
20
The grey hole created by the unenumerated power is a “necessary evil” for the executive power. On
the one hand, the constitution cannot provide a full list of executive powers and the executive has to “take
care” the execution of law. On the other hand, the facts that the executive power cannot be enumerated would
lead to abuse of powers by the executive in the name of opaqueness or expediency.
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Drawing from recent cases of constitutional controversies in Japan,
Taiwan, and Poland, this article suggests that unenumerated powers which
cannot be checked by constitutional mechanisms are the cause of the
expansion of executive primacy in constitutional democracies. By “executive
primacy,” I mean the leading and dominant role of the executive branch,
especially the chief executives, either presidents or prime ministers, to control
the political agenda on policy issues or constitutional interpretation. Chief
executives gain more power by exercising their unenumerated powers without
any constitutional breakdown or coup d’état. The expansion of executive
primacy does not necessarily mean there is a constitutional crisis, but the nonreviewability of unenumerated powers will gradually cause the power
structure to become unbalanced in a constitutional system. This article does
not intend to repeat the age-old debate surrounding separation of powers like
the differences between formal and functional models, but will focus on how
the unenumerated powers micromanage the political system and lead to
constitutional imbalance.
The unenumerated powers discussed in this article are subordinate to,
or affiliated with, constitutional authority of the chief executive, which is
derived from the everyday practice of power.
Due to the frequent indeterminacy appearing in the decision-making
process of the executive power, chief executives may act preemptively to
interpret the constitution and statutes, to control and discipline the
bureaucracy with non-statutory power, to call intra-branch meetings, to
employ “shadow warriors,” or even to rule with alibi (whether this puppetscontrolling could be regarded as the exercise of executive power is another
question). In some cases, unenumerated powers are coupled with party
machinery. The power of party leadership, combined with constitutional
authority of chief executives, makes the power system lean even more towards
executive primacy and expands the scope of unenumerated powers.
The following section begins with the Japanese Prime Minister’s
control of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau to advance his interpretation of
Article 9. Additionally, it also discusses the existence and function of “shadow
warriors” employed by Prime Ministers in Japan to facilitate major policies. It
then moves to Taiwan to analyze the Taiwanese President’s institutional
pendulum between powerlessness and all-powerfulness after the 1997
constitutional amendments. To render their policies, the presidents in Taiwan
have to call intra-branch meetings and to assume the position of party
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chairpersons. These powers are not constitutionally defined and sometimes
are criticized as unconstitutional. However, it is a rational response to
institutional plights in Taiwan’s constitutional system. The Polish case
provides a very different story. Since the return of the Law and Justice party
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, hereinafter, PiS), its chairperson Jarosław
Kaczyński has not assumed any position in the government but functions as
the “Godfather” behind the scenes. Presidents or Prime Ministers have to
follow his political decisions. His power is extra-constitutional and cannot be
counteracted through any constitutional mechanism. The party chairperson
controls the President and Prime Ministers as puppets in his hands. The
informal chain of control by the party leader represents the murkiest zone of
unenumerated powers. The chief executive may share the unenumerated
powers with party leaders like Kaczyński. The outcome appears to be that the
chairperson is the real political leader with the aid of unenumerated powers
stemming from the chief executive. The unenumerated powers in Poland may
be illustrated by the act of falandization, or twisted interpretation, by the
presidents in Poland. Both syndromes of puppet-masters and twisted
interpretation, are critical to the Polish constitutional crisis after 2016.
Following the case studies, this article analyzes the nature and problems
of unenumerated powers of the executive. Building on the taxonomy proposed
by Louis Fisher, the article argues that enumerated powers are analogous to
the “implied powers” in Fisher’s discussion.21 It must be affiliated with formal
constitutional authority, but its scope would spontaneously expand if there
were no sensible constraints on the use of unenumerated powers. The problem
is similar to that of “concept creep” in behavioural science, which is a term
used to describe a situation when the scope of a concept is fuzzy and the
boundaries have become blurred. Political actors take advantage of the
fuzziness of unenumerated powers as a means of expanding their power. In
democratic systems, the judicial branch is usually called upon to resolve
boundary issues. As such, populist politicians often seek to control the court
immediately after taking office, which in order to temper this threat, and
ultimately this action contributes to the re-emergence of executive primacy.
II.

WAR POWER, BUREAUCRACY
CONSTITUTIONAL BATTLES IN JAPAN

AND

SHADOW

WARRIORS:

In the past six years, Japan has been entangled in fierce constitutional
battles over war power. Since Shinzo Abe assumed the position of Prime
21

LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL POWER 70 (2014).
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Minister in 2012, the amendment of Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution has
become an urgent issue for the Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”).22 As one
of the most significant constitutional provisions in the post-war Japanese
Constitution, Article 9, paragraph 1 requires Japan “renounce war as a
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of forces as means of settling
international disputes.” 23 The Renouncement Clause has been a fixture of
Japan’s pacifist constitutionalism for seventy years. However, since the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and
Japan of 1960, the interpretation of Article 9 has been surrounded by
controversy. 24 The existence of Self-Defense Force and the U.S. military
bases in Japan are remnants of the Cold War era.25 Therefore, the question
remains of how to reconcile the Renouncement Clause with the practical need
for national defense, as well as collaboration with the United States. Using a
tactic similar to “court-packing,” the Abe administration took the chance to
reshuffle the personnel of the Legislation Bureau. The Bureau is the entity
responsible for interpreting Article 9 for the government, which is then
binding on the government’s policy. Therefore, if the Bureau’s interpretation
is realigned with Abe’s policy, the government may advance its own agenda
of constitutional revision. The progress on constitutional revision has made
Prime Minister Abe the most powerful leader after WWII and helped his party
to win elections since 2012. The following sections first examine how he
made progress on the issue of Article 9 and later discuss his way to control
bureaucracy in Japan.

KIMURA SŌTA (木村草太), JIEI TAI KENPŌ—KORE KARA NO KAIKEN RONGI NO TAME NI (自衛隊
と憲法-これからの改憲論議のために) [SELF-DEFENSE FORCES AND THE CONSTITUTION—FOR THE
FORTHCOMING CONTROVERSY]54 (2018).
23
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9, para. 1 (Japan).
24
Nishimura Yūichi ( 西 村 裕一 ), Kenpō Kaikaku, Kenpō Hensen, Kaishaku Kaiken―Nippon
Kenpō Gakusetsushi no Kanten kara (憲法改革・憲法変遷・解釈改憲―日本憲法学説史の観点から)
[Constitutional Reform, Constitutional Transition, Interpretation and Revision―From the Viewpoint of the
History of Japanese Constitutional Theory], in ‘KENPŌ KAISEI’ NO HIKAKU SEIJIGAKU (「憲法改正」の比
較政治学) [COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM] 441, 456 (Komamura Keigo (駒村圭吾)
& Machidori Satoshi (待鳥聡史) eds., 2016).
25
The United States-Japan military cooperation was formed to deter the expansion of communism
during the cold war. Therefore, even though Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution requires Japan to
relinquish war power, the self-defense force was set up to protect Japan as well as to collaborate with the U.S.
troops. See YOSHIMOTO SADAAKI (吉本真昭), SHIRAREZARU NIPPON-KOKU KENPŌ NO SHŌTAIKENPŌ NO
SHŌTAI ( 知 ら れ ざ る 日 本 国 憲 法 の 正 体 ) [THE TRUE CHARACTER OF THE UNKNOWN JAPANESE
CONSTITUTION] 343–69 (2014).
22
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Constitutional Maneuvering Through Interpretation: The Tale of
the Legislation Bureau

Since the 1950s, the Legislation Bureau of the Cabinet has issued a
series of interpretations setting up a time-honored distinction between “force”
and “self-defense.” 26 To the legal experts in the Legislation Bureau, the
existence of Japan’s Self-Defense Force is not in violation of the Constitution
because Article 13 of the 1947 Constitution also requires the government to
maintain the Self-Defense Force to secure happiness, or welfare, of the
Japanese people.27 Therefore, to the extent the welfare and happiness of the
Japanese are at stake, the Self-Defense Force is necessary for carrying out this
constitutional mandate. However, Article 9, paragraph 2 provides, “[i]n order
to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as
well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”28 According to the
Legislation Bureau’s interpretations, paragraph 2 refers to “military force,”
which does not include the Self-Defense Force. Therefore, the Self-Defense
Force is within the scope of constitutionally permissible “force.”
Based on this interpretation, Japanese constitutional scholars have
identified two categories of self-defense: the first is “individual self-defense
right” (permissible); while the latter is “collective self-defense right”
(impermissible).29 Individual self-defense is permissible because it is claimed
by the Japanese people as a right to pursue happiness, as well as a right to
protect Japan from foreign attacks. However, if Japan participated in the
alliance force to attack other countries, then it would go beyond constitutional
delegation of self-protection and be involved with war power, which is

NAKAMURA AKIRA (中村明), SENGO SEIJI NI YURETA KENPŌ KYŪ JŌ―NAIKAKU HŌSEI KYOKU
NO JISHIN TO TSUYOSA (戦後政治にゆれた憲法九条―内閣法制局の自信と強さ) [POSTWAR POLITICS
OF THE CONSTITUTION’S ARTICLE 9― CONFIDENCE AND STRENGTH OF THE CABINET LEGISLATION BUREAU]
9 (2d ed. 2001).
27
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 13 (Japan) (“All of the people shall be respected
as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not
interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental
affairs.”).
28
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9, para. 2 (Japan).
29
HASEBE YASUO (長谷部恭男), Anpo Kanren Hōsei o Aratamete Ronzuru (安保関連法制を改め
て論ずる) [Another Discussion on Security-Related Legislation], in ANPO HŌSEI KARA KANGAERU KENPŌ
TO RIKKEN SHUGI. MINSHU SHUGI ( 安 保 法 制 か ら 考 え る 憲 法 と 立 憲 主 義 ・ 民 主 主 義 ) [THE
CONSTITUTION, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY FROM THE VIEW OF SECURITY LAW] 91, 93 (Hasebe
Yasuo ed., 2016).
26
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prohibited by Article 9. 30 Although the line between “individual” and
“collective” is sometimes hard to draw, the Legislation Bureau has concluded
three principles of “individual self-defense” since 1972: (1) there is an
emergent and illegitimate attack on Japan; (2) there are no other suitable
means to expel the attack and the forces used shall follow the least and
necessary principle; and (3) it is not permissible to join any alliance to prevent
the attacks from other countries.31
Against this backdrop, in July 2014, Prime Minister Abe abruptly
changed the definition of “individual self-defense force” by passing a new
resolution in the Cabinet.32 It was a rare case of cabinet politics in Japan, since
the Prime Minister usually defers to the interpretation of the Legislation
Bureau. However, there is no statutory prohibition on the Prime Minister’s
power to reinterpret constitutional provisions. The three new principles
include: (1) the attacks are targeted on Japan or on countries geographically
adjacent to Japan, the attacks threaten the existence of Japan, or the attacks
create immediate danger to destroy the foundation for citizens’ pursuit of life,
liberty and happiness; (2) there are no other suitable means to expel the attacks,
to secure Japan as an independent nation, and to protect the citizens; and (3)
the force used shall follow the least and necessary principle.33 In this new
formula, principle one expressly deviated from the longstanding interpretation
held by the Legislation Bureau, which prohibits “collective self-defense.” The
new interpretation allows Japan to use force when neighboring countries are
under attack by foreign enemy that is regarded as a threat to Japan.34
After the change of interpretation, the cabinet proposed a new
legislation, the Peace and Security Act of 2015 (“PSA”), to allow the SelfDefense Force to participate in military cooperation with allied forces or U.N.
troops, though their participation is limited to providing logistic support

30

KIMURA SŌTA (木村草太), SHŪDAN-TEKI JIEI-KEN WA NAZE IKEN NA NO KA (集団的自衛権はな
ぜ違憲なのか) [WHY IS THE RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE UNCONSTITUTIONAL?] 17–18 (2018).
31
HASEBE YASUO (長谷部恭男), Anpo Hōsei kara Kangaeru SaikōSai to Naikaku Hōsei Kyoku no
Yakuwari (「安保法制」から考える最高裁と内閣法制局の役割) [THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
AND CABINET LEGISLATIVE BUREAU FROM THE VIEW OF “SECURITY LAW”], in ANPO HŌSEI KARA
KANGAERU KENPŌ TO RIKKEN SHUGI. MINSHU SHUGI , supra, at 53, 59–61.
32
Martin Fackler & David E. Sanger, Japan Announces a Military Shift to Thwart China, N.Y. TIMES
(July 1, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/world/asia/japan-moves-to-permit-greater-use-of-itsmilitary.html.
33
SADURSKI, supra note 11, at 61.
34
KIMURA, supra note 22, at 106.
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only. 35 Several constitutional scholars had criticized the bill as
unconstitutional, since it would make collective self-defense an available
option for the government.36 Nevertheless, the legislation was passed by the
National Diet in September 2015. The legislative process of PSA also
engendered the largest public protest against the government since the 1960s.
The most controversial move by the Abe administration is the change
in the interpretation of “self-defense.” In fact, when Mr. Abe first became
Prime Minister in 2006, he demanded the Legislation Bureau to change its
interpretation but it was rejected by then Director-General of the Legislation
Bureau, Reiichi Miyazaki. 37 When Mr. Abe won the election in 2012, he
strategically promoted the Director-General of the Legislation Bureau,
Tsuneyuki Yamamoto, who opposed the change, to the bench of the Supreme
Court. 38 In doing so, Yamamoto cannot prevent Prime Minister Abe from
reinterpreting Article 9, since the Supreme Court is a collegial body and is
passive in interpreting this clause. Later on, Prime Minister Abe appointed the
Ambassador to France, Ichiro Komatsu, as the new Director-General. Under
the new leadership of Mr. Komatsu, the Bureau has drafted new
interpretations about the Self-Defense Force, and the Cabinet later approved
it. 39 Former Director-Generals, including Masahiro Sakata and Judge
Yamamoto, have spoken out on the media opposing the Abe administration’s
35
The Peace and Security Act of 2015 mainly authorizes the government to use forces in the following
cases: (1) to protect the life and safety of oversea Japanese; (2) to defend alliance force stationed in Japan so
as to avoid national emergency and to take legitimate defense; (3) to protect life and safety in the operation
of peacekeeping with the United Nation; (4) when the surrounding area of Japan is under attack. See KIMURA,
supra note 22, at 108–14.
36
Takahashi Kazuyuki (高橋和之), Rikken Shugi ha Seifu ni Yoru Kenpō Kaishaku Henkō o Kinshi
suru (立憲主義は政府による憲法解釈変更を禁止する) [Constitutionalism Prohibits the Government
from Changing Constitutional Interpretation], in SHŪDAN-TEKI JIEI-KEN NO NAN GA MONDAI
KA―KAISHAKU KAIKEN HIHAN (集団的自衛権の何が問題か―解釈改憲批判) [WHAT IS THE PROBLEM
WITH COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE?] 183, 195–96 (Okudaira Yasuhiro (奥平康弘) & Yamaguchi Jirō (山口
二郎) eds., 2014); HASEBE, supra note 29, at 98; KIMURA, supra note 29, at 18.
37
Matsutani Sōichirō ( 松 谷 創 一 郎 ), Wasureppoi Nipponnin no Tame no“Anpo Hōsei ni Itaru
Michi”―Abe Shinzō Shushō no Mittsu no Senryaku (忘れっぽい日本人のための“安保法制に至る道”―
安倍晋三首相の３つの戦略) [“THE ROAD TO SECURITY LAW” FOR FORGETFUL JAPANESE: THE THREE
STRATEGIES OF PRIME MINISTER SHINZO ABE], YAHOO! JAPAN NEWS (Sept. 15, 2015),
https://news.yahoo.co.jp/byline/soichiromatsutani/20150915-00049546/.
38
Jeremy A. Yellen, Shinzo Abe’s Constitutional Ambitions, THE DIPLOMAT (June 12, 2014),
https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/shinzo-abes-constitutional-ambitions/.
39
See KIMURA, supra note 30, at 71–73; Shushō, Kenpō Kaishaku Henkō ‘Kihon wa Kakugi Kettei’
Shūdanteki Jieiken Meguri (首相、憲法解釈変更「基本は閣議決定」集団的自衛権巡り) [THE PRIME
MINISTER CHANGES CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: “BASIC CHANGES ARE CABINET DECISIONS” FOR
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE PATROLS], NIPPON KEIZAI SHINBUN ( 日 本 経 済 新 聞 ) (Feb. 20, 2014),
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS2000F_Q4A220C1EB1000/.
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change of the long-term interpretation. 40 The successor of Ambassador
Komatsu, Mr. Yuusuke Yokobatake, continues to uphold the constitutionality
of collective self-defense right.41
Prime Minister Abe’s control of the Legislation Bureau is quite a
showdown between bureaucrats and politicians. It has been a proud tradition
of Japan that their bureaucrats come from elite colleges and mostly serve for
life, climbing up the ladder all the way to the top.42 Therefore, bureaucracy
acts as a check on the power of the cabinet. The politicians come and go but
the bureaucrats stay for life. The most famous example is the former Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (MITI, now Ministry of Economic, Trade
and Industry), which has been praised as the architect for Japan’s economic
miracle and developmental state.43
However, Prime Minister Abe’s constitutional reinterpretation of
Article 9 has proven that the bureaucrats, even prestigious ones like the
Legislation Bureau who enjoys a reputation of expertise, are no longer free
from political control. In the past, the General-Director was chosen from the
line of Vice General-Directors.44 However, Prime Minister Abe intentionally
appointed an ambassador to the position to meddle in the bureaucratic culture.
Through this display of muscle, Prime Minister Abe is attempting to show
bureaucrats who the boss is now.45

40

See Kyodo, Two Former Heads of Legislation Bureau Blast Security Bills, JAPAN TIMES (June 22,
2015),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/22/national/politics-diplomacy/two-former-headslegislation-bureau-blast-security-bills/#.XDMfXVUzaUk.
41
See Cabinet Legislation Bureau Chief Defends Self over Process of Reinterpreting Article 9,
MAINICHI (Mar. 17, 2016), https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160317/p2a/00m/0na/014000c.
42
CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE 21–22, 198–241 (1982).
43
B.C. KOH, JAPAN'S ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE 252–58 (1989); TSUJI KIYOAKI (辻清明), SHINPAN
NIHON KANRYOSEI NO KENKYU (新版 日本官僚制の研究) [A NEW STUDY OF JAPANESE BUREAUCRACY]
(1969); MURAMATSU MICHIO (村松岐夫), SENGO NIHON NO KANRYOSEI (戦後日本の官僚制) [POSTWAR
JAPANESE BUREAUCRACY] (1981).
44
SAKATA MASAHIRO (阪田雅裕), ‘ HŌ NO BANNIN’ NAIKAKU HŌSEI KYOKU NO KYŌJI (「法の番人」
内閣法制局の矜持) [“THE GUARD OF THE LAW”: THE CABINET LEGISLATION BUREAU’S RESERVATION]
(2014).
45
‘Hō no Bannin’ ni mo Abe Iro Hōsei Kyoku Chōkan ni Komatsu-shi (「法の番人」にも安倍色
法制局長官に小松氏) [Mr. Komatsu is the Same Color as Abe in “The Guard of the Law”], NIHON KEIZAI
SHINBUN ( 日 本 経 済 新 聞 ) (Aug. 3, 2013), https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS02047
_S3A800C1EA2000/. Shimizu Masato (清水真人), Tōchi kikō no henkaku ka hakai ka, Hōsei kyoku jinji no
shinsō ( 統治機構の変革か破壊か、法制局人事の深層 ) [Reform or Destruction of the Governance
System, Deep in the Legislative Personnel Department], NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN (日本経済新聞) (Sept. 3,
2013), https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFK0201Z_S3A900C1000000/.
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Empire-Building Through Personnel Power

In 2014, the Abe administration created a new office in the cabinet
secretariat, the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs ( 内 閣 人 事 局 ,
Naikakujinjikyoku).46 The Bureau is designed to provide a list of appointees
for mid-level officials in the government, ranging from the Assistant Secretary
(審議官, shingikan) or Administrative Vice-Minister (事務次官, jimujikan)
to the Director (部長, bucho). The establishment of the Bureau represents an
attempt by the Prime Minister to place the bureaucrats under his or her control.
For instance, the involvement of the politically appointed State Minister (副
大臣, fukudaijin) in the policymaking process on each level establishes a
second channel to monitor and to oversee the process of administration.47
Personnel power is key to Prime Minister Abe’s constitutional battle
plan, as well as economic reform. 48 By replacing the high-to-mid level
officials, the Prime Minister has realigned the bureaucratic order with his own
political will. After reshuffling the bureaucracy, governmental officials are
less likely to function as safeguards against the personal interests of political
actors. The potential for promotion, as one of the critical motives for career
bureaucrats, would make the mid-level officials more vulnerable to Prime
Minister Abe’s expressed or implicit directives. In fact, this is the culmination
of political reform after the breakdown of the bubble economy in the 1990s.49
During the economic downturn in the mid-1990s, political scandals about
bureaucrats were rampant and bureaucrats lost support and respect from the
general public. 50 In the wake of economic failure, the Hashimoto
administration (1996-1998) proposed administrative reform to reshape the
46

Reiji Yoshida, Abe Moves to Boost Control of Bureaucrats, JAPAN TIMES (May 27, 2014),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/05/27/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-inaugurate-new-officeexert-control-bureaucrats/.
47
See Mayu Terada, The Changing Nature of Bureaucracy and Governing Structure in Japan, 28
WASH. INT’L L.J. 431 (2019).
48
KARUBE KANSUKE (軽部謙介), KANRYŌ-TACHI NO ABENOMIC: IGYŌ NO KEIZAI SEISAKU WA IKANI
TSUKURARETA KA ( 官 僚 た ち の ア ベ ノ ミ ク ス ― 異 形 の 経 済 政 策 は い か に 作 ら れ た か )
[BUREAUCRACY’S ABENOMICS: HOW THIS UNUSUAL POLICY WAS MADE] (2018).
49
HARUKATA TAKENAKA (竹中治堅), SHUSHŌ SHIHAI― NIPPON SEIJI NO HENBŌ (首相支配―日本
政治の変貌) [CONTROL OF THE PRIME MINISTER – TRANSFORMATION OF JAPANESE POLITICS] (2006).
50
See Mary Jordan & Kevin Sullivan, Japanese Minister Resigns over Bribery, WASH. POST (Jan. 28,
1998),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/01/28/japanese-minister-resigns-overbribery-scandal/420f3a7c-17b3-4d5d-a1d6-3d7c9f7cef2e/. See also Mary Jordan, Japan Cracks Down on
Bribery
as
Financial
Scandal
Broadens,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
30,
1998),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/01/30/japan-cracks-down-on-bribery-as-financialscandal-broadens/a9a137e1-eb3c-4c3f-baf6-481186a4aacb/.
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government. When the popular Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (20012006), who had turned the Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”) inside-out, took
office, he expedited the advancement of governmental reform. In his most
ambitious political battle, he successfully privatized the postal service in
Japan and shook complacent bureaucrats.51
The governmental reform initiated by Hashimoto had two prongs: first,
in order to enhance the cabinet’s ability to initiate policy, the Prime Minister
was given more power to coordinate and direct the policy process; second, as
a means of improving the quality of policy-making, the Cabinet Secretariat
created more advisory groups under the Prime Minister. 52 The latter
significantly expanded the role of special advisors to the Prime Minister; these
offices are now considered key players within the cabinet. For example,
during Prime Minister Abe’s second and third terms, one of his five special
advisors, Hirodo Izumi, was described as his “shadow warrior.”53 Indeed, a
recent scandal involving the opening of a veterinary school in a special
location has generated rumors that Mr. Izumi might have received bribery on
behalf of the Prime Minister or his family member.54
Controlling personnel power, penetrating the policy process, and
assigning special advisors as shadow warriors: all of these “reforms” are
unrelated to the macro function of constitutional structure, but are necessary
for facilitating “governmental reforms” in Japan. These changes do not
require any constitutional revision or amendment but still reshapes Japan’s
bureaucracy-political relationship. They have made the Prime Minister more
powerful than ever through these unenumerated and facilitative powers,
which discipline the bureaucracy and cast tacit influence upon the
policymaking process.

51

The
Man
Who
Remade
Japan,
ECONOMIST
(Sept.
14,
2006),
https://www.economist.com/asia/2006/09/14/the-man-who-remade-japan. See also Anthony Faiola, Japan
Approves Postal Privatization, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/10/14/AR2005101402163.html.
52
TAKENAKA, supra note 49, 58–59.
53
In the news report, Mr. Izumi claimed that his job is to express the will of the Prime Minister, when
the Prime Minister cannot express himself publicly. ‘Sōri wa Ienai kara Watakushi ga’ to Shushōhosakan
ga… Zenjikan Shōgen ( 「総理は言えないから私が」と首相補佐官が … 前次官証言 ) [“Because I
cannot say the Prime Minister,” said the First Co-Leader… Testimonial of the Assistant Secretary General],
ASAHI SHINBUN ( 朝 日 新 聞 ) (May 30, 2017), https://www.asahi.com/articles/
ASK5Y6FFKK5YUTIL04R.html .
54
Reiji Yoshida, Breaking Down the Kake Gakuen Scandal: Who’s Lying, Abe or His Political
Opponents?, JAPAN TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/06/01/national/politicsdiplomacy/breaking-kake-gakuen-scandal-whos-lying-abe-political-opponents/.
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The Prime Minister now occupies the center of politics. On the one
hand, he personifies his electoral support and designates himself as the
singular representative of the whole nation. On the other hand, he turns the
electoral mandate to marshal bureaucracy. It might not be an exaggeration to
say that Prime Minister Abe has fulfilled the dream of generations of Japanese
politicians.
In the case of constitutional revision, Prime Minister Abe managed to
control the personnel of the Legislation Bureau, which allowed him to gain
the power to redefine Article 9 through the mouth of the chief officer in the
Legislation Bureau. With this new interpretation in place, further
constitutional amendment is foreseeable. Though the amendment itself is not
such an urgent issue among citizens, Prime Minister Abe and the LDP have
harnessed patriotism and nationalism through this ongoing constitutional
battle. They have gained popular support by repeating the necessity of
constitutional reform in recent parliamentary elections.55
To be clear, the personnel power, policy initiative power, and
monitoring power are all subordinate and supportive to the Prime Minister’s
executive power, which is constitutionally ordained. However, these
unenumerated executive powers are now the vital wheels for the Prime
Minister to build his empire in Japan’s politics.
III.

COORDINATION GONE WRONG: THE AMBIGUITY
POWERS IN TAIWAN

OF

PRESIDENTIAL

The Constitution of the Republic of China (known as Taiwan) provided
a parliamentary system where the Premier was the head of the executive
branch. 56 However, after democratization, the Constitution was amended
seven times. During its second and third iterations, in 1992 and 1994, the
governmental system was redesigned as a semi-presidential system with direct
presidential election nationwide. 57 In its current form, the Premier is more
like a managing director of the team of the executive, while the President is
the boss. The institutional logic is that the President won the election and
55

LDP, under the leadership of Mr. Abe, has won general elections for the House of Representatives
in 2012, 2014, and 2017; it also won the elections of the House of Councilors (Senate) in 2013 and 2016.
56
MINGUO XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 53 (1947) (Taiwan) (“the Executive Yuan shall be the highest
administrative organ of the State”).
57
See e.g., ROBERT ELGIE, SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM: SUB-TYPES AND DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE
28–29 (1st ed. 2011).
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appointed her Premier to be accountable to the Legislative Yuan, as well as
the President. The Premier is accountable to the Legislative Yuan, in that
Article 3 of the 1997 Amendment sustained the original constitutional
language, “[T]he Executive Yuan shall be responsible to the Legislative Yuan,”
even though the responsibilities of the Executive Yuan had been altered
greatly.58 Therefore, as of 2006, the Constitutional Court reiterated that the
Premier is still the chief executive.59 However, the same court also stated in
another decision in 2007 that, “subject to the scope of his executive powers
granted by the Constitution and the Amendment to the Constitution, the
President is the highest executive officer and has the duty to preserve national
security and national interests.”60
The Constitutional Court’s decisions did not make Taiwan’s mixed
system of President-Premier semi-presidentialism more rational and stable.
Jiunn-rong Yeh, a prominent public law scholar, has argued that “although
constitutional revisions resulted in direct presidential elections, the
President’s role and relationship with the Premier and the Legislative Yuan
remain ambiguous . . . .”61 He pointed out that “[t]he constitutional ambiguity
surrounding presidential powers only exacerbates the tension [of partisan
politics].” 62 The tension among different political parties (representing
divergent national identities) reversely constricts the scope of presidential
power. In Interpretation No. 520, the newly elected President Chen Shu-bian
of the longtime opposition party, Democratic Progressive Party (“DPP”),
suspended the construction of the No. 4 Nuclear Power Plant by way of the
Premier’s cabinet meeting. However, the Court ruled that even though the
President, with his new mandate, may propose new policies or revise existing

58

MINGUO
XIANFA
[Constitution]
art.
3
(2005)
(Tiwan),
https://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0000002.
59
Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 613 ( 司 法 院 大 法 官 解 釋 第 613 號 解 釋 ) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 613] (July 21, 2006). In this decision, the court responded to the constitutional status of
independent agency in Taiwan and reasoned that even though it is important to uphold independency, it is
equally important to emphasize the accountability. The Legislative Yuan cannot deprive the participation of
the Executive Yuan in appointing members of the National Communication Commission, which is an
independent agency.
60
Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 627 ( 司 法 院 大 法 官 解 釋 第 627 號 解 釋 ) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 627] (June 15, 2007) (rationale located in paragraph 10).
61
JIUNN-RONG YEH, THE CONSTITUTION OF TAIWAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 65 (2016).
62
Id.
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policies, the Executive Branch has to work with the Legislative Yuan to make
the decision jointly, which is the essence of the five-power government.63
The construction of No. 4 Nuclear Power Plant has been an entangled
political issue in Taiwan for almost four decades. After President Ma Yingjeou won his reelection in 2012, his premier, Mr. Jiang Yi-hua announced
several options to deal with the nuclear power plant, including referendum
and immediate termination. However, the Legislative Yuan majority, which
also belonged to the same party as President Ma, disagreed with either
referendum or immediate termination. President Ma could not control the
Legislative Yuan, even though he was also the chairperson of their shared
party, Kuomingtang (the Chinese National Party, “KMT”). This is the
backdrop of the following episode, which was a showdown between the
Speaker of the Legislative Yuan and the President, both of whom are members
of the KMT.64
A.

Presidential Control of the Legislative Branch: Party Discipline
and the Prosecutorial Power

In September 2013, less than a year before the massive protest of the
Sunflower Movement, a constitutional dispute arose between the President
and the Legislative Yuan’s Speaker. The constitutional controversy stemmed
from a report sent from the Attorney General to the President.65 On August
31, 2013, the Attorney General, Mr. Shi-ming Huang, found that the Speaker
of the Legislative Yuan, Mr. Jing-pyng Wang, had called the Minister of
Justice and the chief prosecutor at the High Court to lobby for a criminal case
which involved the caucus whip of the opposition party, Mr. Chien-ming Ker,
who was also the Speaker’s good friend.66 The Attorney General received this
information through wiretapping. Upon learning this information, he went
Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 520 ( 司 法 院 大 法 官 解 釋 第 520 號 解 釋 ) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 520] (Jan. 15, 2001); Hsu Tzong-Li(許宗力), Yingjie Lifaguo De Daolai ？！－Ping Shizi
Di 520 Hao Jieshi( 迎接立法國的到來？！－評釋字第五二 ○ 號解釋 ) [Welcome the Arrival of the
Legislative State?!－Commentary on the Fifth and Second Interpretation], in FA YU GUOJIA QUANLI (2) (法
與國家權力(二)) [2 LAW AND STATE POWER] 383, 385–86 (2007). In terms of Five-Power Government, see
YEH, supra note 61, at 52–57.
64
See YEH, supra note 61, at 67–68, 175–77.
65
Lawrence Chung, Ma Ying-jeou Drops Appeal, Allowing Speaker Wang Jin-pyng to Keep role,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 6, 2013), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1325475/ma-yingjeou-drops-appeal-allowing-speaker-wang-jin-pyng-keep-role.
66
Faith Hung, Taiwan's Ma Asks Speaker of Legislature to Step Down (Sept. 11, 2013),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-politics/taiwans-ma-asks-speaker-of-legislature-to-step-downidUSBRE98A04320130911.
63
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directly to the president’s office to report the scandal; the President requested
that he provide a briefing of the case to the Premier. Meanwhile, President Ma
also summoned the Premier to his residence that same night and told him
about the case. About one week after the initial report, the Attorney General
held a press conference to disclose the case to the whole nation. Two days
later, the President held another press conference in his capacity as the KMT
chairperson to revoke Speaker Wang’s membership within the KMT.67 The
Speaker would have lost his seat in the parliament if the revocation were valid,
since the Speaker was elected through the track of proportional representation,
which requires that the Speaker first be a member of the KMT. 68 Some
conspiracy theories suggest that President Ma was upset by the Speaker’s
prolonged handling of China-Taiwan trade agreement and wanted someone to
take over his job. However, because Taiwan has adopted the semi-presidential
system, the President has no power to “fire” the Speaker in any way. Therefore,
by way of party disciplinary procedure, President Ma found a channel through
which he could substantially control the Speaker.
After this unprecedented development, the Speaker immediately filed
an injunction in court to safeguard his membership and later sued the KMT.
He won the civil case on his party membership based on procedural grounds.69
Mr. Chien-ming Ker also sued the Attorney General and President Ma,
claiming that they had violated the Communication Security and Surveillance
Act (“Wiretapping Act”), which prohibits government officers from
disclosing wiretapped information absent a legitimate reason. Mr. Ker
claimed that neither the Attorney General nor the President should have
released the information at a press conference or passed the unlawful
information on to the Premier. He won the case against the Attorney General
but lost the case against President Ma in the district court. 70 After the

67
Lawrence Chung, Taiwan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng Expelled from KMT, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST (Sept. 12, 2013), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1308336/taiwan-speaker-wang-jin-pyngexpelled-kmt.
68
Id. at 2.
69
Zuigao Fayuan [Sup. Ct.], Civil Ruling, 104 TAI-SHANG NO. 704 (2015) (Taiwan). The High Court
holds that the process of dismissal did not satisfy the KMT’s internal rule. However, on appeal, the Supreme
Court ruled for Mr. Wang in another procedural ground: the KMT did not assigned attorney in time as
required by the Civil Procedure Act, so it rejected the appeal. Id.
70
Ker Chien-Ming Suing Ma Ying-Jeou, Huang Shih-Ming on Ten Counts, TAIWAN NEWS (Oct. 3,
2013), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/2314203.
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prosecutor in the case against President Ma appealed, the high court recently
ruled in favor of Mr. Ker and sentenced President Ma to four months in jail.71
To be sure, the macro mechanism of checks and balances in Taiwan is
still in effect and, so far, none of the President’s actions have been held
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. The checks-and-balances
mechanisms such as the appointment power by the President, passive
dissolution, non-confidence vote, or veto power against legislation, have not
ceased to function during the Ma administration, but they also have not kicked
in to tame the chief executive’s power to seize the other branches. Therefore,
the problem is not within the macro design of the checks-and-balances
mechanism, but in how the President uses his or her power.72
To expand his or her power, the President may use the informal
influence over key officers. For example, in 2006, Parliament revised the
statute regarding the appointment process of the Attorney General, providing
the President with the power to appoint the Attorney General subject to the
consent of the Parliament with a fixed term of four years.73 This institutional
design aims to secure the independence of the Attorney General, keeping him
away from the chain of command under the Executive Yuan. However, the
Attorney General in this case apparently regarded the President as his boss
and, therefore, reported the scandal between the Speaker and the DPP’s whip
to the President at the earliest possible chance. Institutionally speaking, the
Attorney General should function like an independent agency but,
strategically thinking, he would need support from political branches to avoid
any backfire.
The Legislative Yuan is a collective institution, which may not provide
the steady support that the Attorney General is inclined to seek out. The
President is the one who nominates the Attorney General and is in one of the
most legitimate positions of power with the authority to distribute political
resources to other political offices. Furthermore, the President enjoys the
power to appoint the Premier who leads the whole government. 74 Therefore,
it is rational for the Attorney General to turn to the President before jumping
71

Taiwan Gaodeng Fayuan [High Ct.], Criminal Decision, 106 ZHU-SHANG-YI NO. 2 (2018) (Taiwan).
Huang Cheng-Yi (黃丞儀), Zongtong de Zhengzhi Xingwei Bu Neng Shi Xianfa Weisuo Zhi Ling
(總統的政治行為不能使憲法萎縮至零) [The President’s Political Actions Cannot Shrink the Constituion
to Zero], 232 TAIWAN FAXUE ZAZHI (台灣法學雜誌) 1, 1–2 (2013).
73
Fayuan Zuzhifa [Court Organization Act], art. 66 (2006) (Taiwan).
74
MINGUO XIANFA [Additional Articles of the Constitution], art. 3 (2005) (China),
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0000002.
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into troubled waters. As a result, the President may then cast influence over
the decisions of the Attorney General, since he turns to the President for help.
In this case, the relationship between the President and the Attorney General
ran completely against the statutory function of the Attorney General as an
independent agency. Meanwhile, the Premier was being informed by the
President, further turning the parliamentary design, enshrined in the
constitution, into a presidential system. The consequence was a President who
sat at the government’s apex, and this was achieved without having to change
a single word in the constitution or its amendments.
The presidents are usually the ones who lead their parties to victory in
an election and then, after the election, they continue to chair their parties.
Although the constitution does not prohibit the President from concurrently
serving as the Chairperson of the ruling party, the overlapped capacities
effectuate the President’s immense power to control not only the executive,
but also the legislative branch. Opponents of the unity of party leadership and
presidency often argue that the fusion of presidential power and disciplinary
power from the ruling party relinquishes the President from any form of
checking mechanism. 75 However, in a parliamentary system, the prime
minister must also serve as the ruling party’s leader. He or she is also the chair
in the cabinet council. Therefore, the unity of party leadership and the
executive power is common in the parliamentary system and would not be
attacked as unconstitutional. The argument has also been made that presidents
in a mixed system like Taiwan are not accountable to the legislative branch.
He or she does not need to appear in the Legislative Yuan to defend the ruling
party’s policy or legislation, like a prime minister in a parliamentary system.
Neither does he or she have to give a speech such as the “State of the Union,”
which is delivered by the U.S. president. Checks and balances between the
president and the legislature do not seem to work in Taiwan’s mixed system.
76

Su Yen-Tu ( 蘇 彥 圖 ), Liangzhong Jilüjian De Zha zheng: Yige Guanyu Taiwan Dangqian
Dang/Guo Feji Zhengyi De Xushi Yu Pinglun (兩種紀律間的戰爭:一個關於台灣當前黨／國分際爭議的
敘事與評論) [Two Disciplinary Wars: A Narrative and Commentary on Taiwan's Current Party/Country
Disputes], 232 TAIWAN FAXUE ZAZHI (台灣法學雜誌) 14, 17–18 (2013).
76
However, the president is still subject to impeachment and presidential election every four years.
MINGUO XIANFA [Additional Articles of the Constitution] art. 2, para. 4–5 (2005) (Taiwan) (“The terms of
office for both the president and the vice president shall be four years. The president and the vice president
may only be re- elected to serve one consecutive term; and the provisions of Article 47 of the Constitution
shall not apply.” “Should a motion to impeach the president or the vice president initiated by the Legislative
Yuan and presented to the grand justices of the Judicial Yuan for adjudication be upheld by the Constitutional
Court, the impeached person shall forthwith be relieved of his duties.”).
75
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In Interpretation No. 613 and 589, the court reiterated that the exercise
of one power could not deprive the other power of its core function. However,
in the aforementioned cases, whether the coordinative and decisional power
affiliated with the president infringes upon the core function of other powers
is not clearly evident, unless it has expressly violated the statutes. In this vein,
the presidents actually enjoy unenumerated executive power and keenly
exercise it as a control mechanism in Taiwan.
B.

Power to Call Intra-Branches Meetings

Although the President is elected directly by the people, Taiwan’s
constitution provides the President with very limited power. As previously
mentioned, the 1947 Constitution adopted the parliamentary system. However,
the first National Assembly passed Temporary Provisions in 1948 to bestow
immense emergency power to the President, rather than to the Premier of the
Executive Yuan, who is the head of the executive branch, according to the
constitutional text.77 In 1960, the Temporary Provisions were further revised
to allow President Chiang Kai-shek to be reelected without term limitation.
In 1966 and 1972, the National Assembly twice revised the Temporary
Provisions to delegate to the President the power to reorganize the government
and to create new bureaus within the President’s office. 78 Throughout the
period of martial law, presidential power became overwhelmingly dominant
and powerful. Some scholars even claim that the constitution’s parliamentary
system was mostly destroyed during that authoritarian time.79
After the lift of martial law in 1987, and the abolishment of Temporary
Provisions in 1991, the Constitution went through a series of amendments,
among which the adoption of a semi-presidential system in 1997 was the most
significant. According to the 1997 Amendment, the President enjoys the
power to appoint the Premier of the Executive Yuan without consent from
members of the Legislative Yuan, i.e., the parliament.80 However, according
to the constitution, the Premier is the one who shall be accountable to the
parliament. He or she leads the cabinets to propose legislation, to submit
77

Dongyuan Kanluan Shiqi Linshi Tiaokuan [Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of
National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion] (promulgated by the Nat’l Assemb. Of
the Republic of China, Apr. 18, 1949, effective May 10, 1948) art. 1 (1948) (China).
78
Cheng-Yi Huang, Frozen Trials: Political Victims and Their Quest for Justice, in TAIWAN AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A STORY OF TRANSFORMATION (Jerome A. Cohen et al. eds., 2018).
79
YEH, supra note 61, at 34–36.
80
MINGUO XIANFA [Additional Articles of the Constitution], art. 3 (2005) (China).

416

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 28 NO. 2

budgets, and to debate major policies in the parliament. The constitutional
court also holds that the Premier of the Executive Yuan is the head of
administration, not the President.81
This brings trouble to the President. Once he or she is elected, he or she
has no vehicle to carry out his or her campaign promise. The President
becomes a powerless person in the government, owing to the original design
of parliamentary system. Though the 1997 Amendment claims to adopt a
semi-presidential system, it does not provide the President with power to
dissolve the parliament at will.82 He or she can only dissolve the parliament
when the parliament passes a no-confidence vote on the Premier. In practice,
there has never been a vote of no-confidence casted by the parliament; this is
because parliament do not want to give the President any chance to dissolve
the parliament. Hence, the President, if he or she strictly follows the
constitution and its amendments, would not be able to participate in policy
deliberation or communicate with members of the executive cabinet. Nor can
the President remove the Premier after appointment.
Such dilemmas are due to political compromises in the process of
democratization, which have not been cured in the past two decades. 83
However, since the first presidential election in 1996, each Taiwanese
President has strived to consolidate his or her power not only from within, but
also beyond the constitutional purview of the presidency. One salient
evidentiary component of this is that all of the Presidents, from both the KMT
or from the DPP, have engaged in the practice of setting up meetings with the
Premier and cabinet members, sometimes even with parliamentary leaders
and mayors of his or her own party. During these informal meetings, major
policies are discussed and finalized. However, Article 58 of the Constitution
provides no such power to the Presidents. 84 It stipulates that all the bills,
budgets, and major policies shall be presented and decided in the Executive
Yuan Council, which consists of cabinet members. Meanwhile, the President
Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 613 ( 司 法 院 大 法 官 解 釋 第 613 號 解 釋 ) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 613] (July 21, 2006); Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 645 (司法院大法官解釋第 645 號
解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 645] (July 11, 2008).
82
YEH, supra note 61, at 65.
83
Id. at 37–38.
84
Xie Jun-Lin (謝君臨), Ma Ying-Jiu Xiemian Yi “Yuanji Tiaojiequan Kangbian” Xuezhe Dalian (馬
英九洩密案以「院際調解權」抗辯 學者打臉) [Ma Ying-jeou’s Leaked Case is Based on the Scholarly
Defense of “Inter-agency Mediation Rights”], ZIYOU SHIBAO ( 自 由 時 報 ) (Mar. 31, 2018),
http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/society/breakingnews/2382413.
81
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is permitted by the Constitution to call a meeting among different Yuans (in
this case, the Legislative Yuan and Executive Yuan) only when there is a
dispute between two or more Yuans.85 Therefore, these meetings convened by
the President are extra-constitutional by nature. Moreover, although there is
very little mention about the presidential office in the Constitution, the
President organizes advisory boards or meetings, which provides
comprehensive policy suggestions or agenda items, such as the human rights
consultative committee, indigenous historical justice committee, pension
reform meeting, and judicial reform council. All these efforts are a direct
response to the constitutional impotence of the presidency after the 1997
Amendment. 86
During President Ma Ying-Jeou’s administration (2008-2016), critics
argued that his informal meetings with the Premier, the Speaker of the
Legislative Yuan, and KMT party leaders in the presidential office were
unconstitutional, due to lack of accountability to the parliament during the
decision-making process for major policies decided at these meetings. For
example, the continual construction of the No. 4 Nuclear Power Plant, the
trade service pact with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the lifting
of restrictions on Chinese investment were all presented, negotiated, and
concluded during these informal meetings convened by the President, rather
than during the Executive Yuan Council meetings. 87 Since the power to
convene these meetings cannot be found in the Constitution, President Tsai
Ing-wen, who is also the Chairperson of the DPP, invited the Premier, cabinet
members and key legislators to dine at her residence so as to avoid criticism.88
President Tsai asserted that she coordinated this event based on her capacity
as the Chairperson of the ruling party. This rationale fuses the nature of the
85
MINGUO XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] (1947) art. 44 (Taiwan) (“In case of disputes between two or
more Yuan other than those concerning which there are relevant provisions in this Constitution, the President
may call a meeting of the Presidents of the Yuan concerned for consultation with a view to reaching a
solution.”).
86
Xiang Chenghua (項程華) & Xie Guo-Zhang (謝國璋), Woguo Banzongtongzhi Zongtong Zhiquan
Jieshi De Tantao-Xingzheng Zongtong Yu Zhongcai Zongtong Quanshi De Keneng ( 我國半總統制總統職
權解釋的探討－行政總統與仲裁總統詮釋的可能) [A Probe into the Interpretation of the Presidency of
the Presidential System in China—The Possible Interpretation of the President and the Arbitration President],
43 XIAN ZHENGSHI DAI (憲政時代) 181, 203–04 (2018).
87
Zhāng Yòu Zōng (張佑宗), Zhāng Yòu Zōng Zhuān Lán Shì Mínzhǔ Zhìdù Quēxiàn Bùshì Zǒngtǒng
Kèyì (張佑宗專欄：是民主制度缺陷 不是總統刻意) [Zhang Youzong Column: Is a Defect in the
Democratic System, Not the President’s Deliberate], SHÀNG BÀO ( 上 報 ) (Oct. 20, 2016),
https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=5967.
88
Zhong Li-Hua (鍾麗華), Zhizheng Juece Xietiao Huiyi Hanka (執政決策協調會議 喊卡) [Ruling
Decision Coordination Meeting], ZIYOU SHIBAO ( 自 由 時 報 ) (Apr. 10, 2017),
http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/1092931.
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parliamentary system with the that of the presidency. The power to coordinate
is now more entrenched and affiliated with the presidency than ever before,
though it is still not enumerated in the constitution.
As we have seen in the case of Taiwan, the unenumerated powers
exercised by the Presidents are responses to institutional plights left by
constitutional reform in the 1990s. The Presidents are elected by the whole
nation but cannot directly lead the administration. To render her policies and
overcome institutional hurdles, she has to use the party as a platform to
coordinate with both the cabinet members and key legislators. However, if all
the major decisions are decided behind the scenes during informal meetings,
then the checks and balances mechanisms are simply bypassed. The twilight
zone of party leadership enables the Presidents to be the boss of both the
executive and the legislature, but it also creates a dilemma that Presidents feel
both powerless and all-powerful.
IV.

THE TURBULENCE OVER LAW AND POLITICS: UNSEEN AND UNCHECKED
POLITICAL LEADERS IN POLAND
A.

The Puppets’ Master: Party Leadership and Political
Unaccountability

It is well known that in a parliamentary system the majority party’s
leader is the Prime Minister. However, this is not always the case in Poland.
The Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, “PiS”) made this
exception twice. In 2005, PiS won the elections and formed a coalition with
the League of Polish Families party (Liga Polskich Rodzin, “LPR”) and the
Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland party (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej
Polskiej, “Samoobrona RP”).89 At that time, the leader of PiS was Jarosław
Kaczyński, who took over as PiS’s chairman from his twin brother, Lech
Kaczyński in 2003. Jarosław announced, however, that he would not serve as
Prime Minister, so that it would not reduce the chances of Lech, who was
running for the presidency in two weeks. It was Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz
who was chosen and later appointed to the Prime Minister position. 90
However, Mr. Marcinkiewicz resigned in 2006 so, this time, it was Jarosław
Kaczyński, the party’s chairperson, who assumed the position of Prime
Minister. Jarosław Kaczyński ran the government for about a year, until the
89
Radoslaw Markowski, The Polish Elections of 2005: Pure Chaos or a Restructuring of the Party
System?, 29 WEST EUR. POL. 814, 830 (2006).
90
Frances Millard, Poland's Politics and the Travails of Transition after 2001: The 2005 Elections,
58 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 1007, 1025 (2006).
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coalition collapsed in 2007 and the Civic Platform party (Platforma
Obywatelska, “PO”) took the office. Jarosław Kaczyński has remained as the
leader of PiS since then.
After two years of being in the opposition, PiS under Kaczyński's
leadership won the election in 2015. This time there was no need to form a
coalition in parliament.91 However, similar to what happened in 2005, despite
being the leader of the majority party, Kaczyński decided not to take the office
of Prime Minister. Instead, he chose Beata Szydło, a barely recognizable
member of the party, to be the candidate for the position of Prime Minister
during the campaign. Mrs. Szydło had just operated a successful presidential
campaign for Andrzej Duda a few months earlier. Since people were afraid of
strongmen like Kaczyński, PiS decided that having Beata Szydło as the
candidate might help them to secure more ballots.92 Mrs. Szydło served as
Prime Minister until December 2017. Her successor, Mr. Mateusz
Morawiecki, is believed to have been handpicked by Jarosław Kaczyński as
well.
As a result of this political scenario, there is now a system of dual
leadership in the Polish politics: officially, Prime Minister Szydło or
Morawiecki leads the cabinet; however, as a matter of fact, Kaczyński has
been leading the country through his party, PiS. Many have suggested that the
final decision-making authority does not belong to the Prime Minister, but
instead lies in the hands of Kaczyński.93 Ironically, Kaczyński now enjoys
more powers than he had in 2005 even though he is just a member of
91
In fact, PiS shared its electoral list with minor parties: Poland Together (Polska Razem, led by the
Minister of Science and Higher Education Jaroslaw Gowin) and Poland United (Solidarna Polska, led by the
Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro) ran for the election as the candidates of Law and Justice (PiS). Even
now, in the parliament, they are the members of the Parliamentary Club of Law and Justice. Therefore, strictly
speaking, PiS did not enjoy a single-party majority. However, both minor parties were aligned with PiS, they
shared similar ideologies with PiS and took actions in accordance with PiS’s agenda. See Ben Stanley,
Populism in Poland, in POPULISM AROUND THE WORLD: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 67, 78 (Daniel
Stockemer ed., 2018).
92
On a party conference, Kaczyński asked PiS to put Szydło’s candidacy forward for the prime
minister, because “the [presidential] election showed that Poles are expecting new faces and expecting a
generational change.” Pawel Sobczak & Wiktor Szary, Poland's Kaczynski Names Deputy Party Leader as
Potential PM, REUTERS (June 20, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-election-PiSidUSKBN0P00DZ20150620.
93
According to an article by Jan Cienski of Politico, an anonymous close political ally revealed that
there’s a line of ministers and deputy prime ministers waiting to see Kaczyński who listens to them all and
in the end he makes a decision and those decisions are final. See Jan Cienski, Poland’s ‘Powerholic’,
POLITICO (July 11, 2016), https://www.politico.eu/article/polands-powerholic-jaroslaw-kaczynski-warsawlaw-and-justice-party-pis/.
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parliament now.94 As the leader of the majority party he also has the power to
give advice on public policy and to set up the political agenda. However, what
he has done goes beyond advice and coordination—he substantially rules the
country without any checks. Whatever Kaczyński says transforms into the
government’s decisions. For example, Kaczyński once mentioned that Poland
should not let the incumbent President of the European Council, Donald Tusk,
who also served as prime minister of Poland from 2007 to 2014, be re-elected
to the office. After repeating his remarks fiercely, Prime Minister Szydło
stated that the Polish government would not vote for Tusk in 2017 and would
propose its own candidate.95
Another example is that, after a big controversy regarding the
Amendment on Environmental Protection Law, Kaczyński declared that the
amendment must be rewritten, at least partially. A couple of days later, the
government proposed changes to the bill. It was also openly known that the
ministers, the Prime Minister, and the President met with Kaczyński regularly,
though not in the Chancellery Building of the Prime Minister, but at
Nowogrodzka street in Warsaw, where the main building of the party is
located.96 It is common understanding among the Polish people that almost
every important decision of the executive power has gone through the
machinery of Kaczyński.97
Although there is no hard evidence, one thing is clear: Kaczyński is the
most powerful politician in Poland nowadays. He dictates the direction of the
Prime Minister (and, through him or her, controls the cabinet and the
government), and he leads the majority party, and he even has critical
influence over the President of the Republic.98 So, as the leader of his party,
An interesting fact: as he is the leader of the Law and Justice party, he is also being called “Prezes
Kaczyński,” not “MP Kaczyński.” While in Polish, “prezes” and “prezydent” are two different words, the
English translation of these two words is the same: “president.” So, Jarosław Kaczyński is being called the
“president,” despite being just a regular MP. With the passiveness of the President of Poland and the Prime
Minister, this word underlies the wicked position that Kaczyński holds in Poland right now.
95
Warsaw Formally Ditches Support for Tusk EU Candidacy, DW (Apr. 3, 2017),
https://www.dw.com/en/warsaw-formally-ditches-support-for-tusk-eu-candidacy/a-37811620. This ended
in a big diplomatic fiasco with the twenty-seven EU countries voting for Donald Tusk and Poland being both
the homeland of Tusk and the only country against him. Donald Tusk Re-Elected as European Council
President Despite Poland's Objections, DW (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/donald-tusk-re-electedas-european-council-president-despite-polands-objections/a-37874185.
96
Cienski, supra note 93.
97
Id.
98
President Andrzej Duda has tried some public-relation activities to show that he is independent from
the PiS. For example, since 2017, Duda has initiated a constitutional referendum and proposed to hold a
referendum on November 10 and 11, 2018, on the latter Poland marks its centenary of independence.
94
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he has the final say on important policies, which would later be effectuated by
the government and parliamentary majority with the President’s signature. If
he were the Prime Minister, Kaczyński’s actions would be held accountable
politically. If there were at least forty-six members of the Sejm (i.e., the
parliament) to file a motion of censure against the whole Council of Ministers,
PiS would have to propose a new candidate for the Prime Minister. 99
Meanwhile, were there at least sixty-nine members of the Sejm to file a motion
of censure against the particular minister, PiS would have to appoint a new
one.100 However, since Kaczyński is neither the Prime Minister nor a minister,
there is no way to counterbalance his power. On top of his politically
unchecked power, literally speaking, Kaczyński may change the prime
minister at will. The only branch that was still independent from his control is
the judiciary, especially the constitutional court. Therefore, immediately after
PiS came to the power, they turned to the Constitutional Tribunal and tried to
get control over the National Council of Judiciary.101

However, this proposal was rejected by Senate in July 2018. See Senators Reject Polish President’s Push for
Constitution
Referendum,
RADIO
POLAND
(July
25,
2018),
http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/374792,Senators-reject-Polish-president’s-push-for-constitutionreferendum. Those fifteen proposed constitutional referendum questions are still available on the official
website of the President of the Republic of Poland. The Proposed Constitutional Referendum Questions,
PRESIDENT PL. (June 12, 2018). Additionally, in July 2017, Duda unexpectedly vetoed the controversial bills
on judicial reforms which ignited huge protests on the streets and critics say it would give PiS power to
choose judges. See Polish President Andrzej Duda to Veto Judicial Jeforms, DW (July 25, 2017),
https://www.dw.com/en/polish-president-andrzej-duda-to-veto-judicial-reforms/a-39811692. See Wojciech
Sadurski, Judicial “Reform” in Poland: The President’s Bills are as Unconstitutional as the Ones he Vetoed,
VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Nov. 28, 2007), https://verfassungsblog.de/judicial-reform-in-poland-the-presidentsbills-are-as-unconstitutional-as-the-ones-he-vetoed/.
99
Tekst Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Ogloszono W. Dz. U. 1997 nr 78 poz 483, Rozdzial VI
[Constitution] art. 158 para. 1 (1997) (Poland), http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm
(“The Sejm shall pass a vote of no confidence in the Council of Ministers by a majority of votes of the
statutory number of Deputies, on a motion moved by at least 46 Deputies and which shall specify the name
of a candidate for Prime Minister. If such a resolution has been passed by the Sejm, the President of the
Republic shall accept the resignation of the Council of Ministers and appoint a new Prime Minister as chosen
by the Sejm, and, on his application, the other members of the Council of Ministers and accept their oath of
office.”). Poland does not have the impeachment process like other countries do, but a slightly similar
procedure provided in Article 198 and relevant provisions offers the basis of the responsibility to be discussed
in the State Tribunal for infringement upon the Constitution.
100
Tekst Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej ogloszono W. Dz. U. 1997, nr 78 poz 483, Rozdzial
VI [Constitution] art. 159, para. 1 (1997) (Poland), http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm
(“The Sejm may pass a vote of no confidence on an individual minister. A motion for the vote of no
confidence has to be submitted by at least sixty-nine deputies. The provisions of Article 158, para. 2 shall
apply as appropriate.”).
101
MALGORZATA SZULEKA ET AL., HELSINKI FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CRISIS IN POLAND 2015 – 2016 (Joanna Smetek trans., 2016), https://www.hfhr.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/HFHR_The-constitutional-crisis-in-Poland-2015-2016.pdf.
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Falandization: President’s Power to Interpret the Law

There are a couple of presidential actions in Poland teetering upon the
borderline of his constitutional powers. For example, as the prelude to the
constitutional showdown of court-packing in 2015, President Andrzej Duda
refused to swear in three justices to the Constitutional Tribunal whom were
appointed by the Civic Platform government. In an interview with the Polish
Radio in November 2015, the President described the elections of
Constitutional Tribunal judges by the previous Sejm as “a gross violation of
democratic principles and the stability of a democratic state based on the rule
of law.”102 However, there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing any
interpretative power to the President so as to reject constitutional judges
whose appointment have been passed by the Sejm. When presidential
interpretation of the Constitution or a statute go too far, the Polish people use
a term, falandization of law (falandyzacja prawa), to describe the presidential
manipulation of legal interpretation to achieve his political purposes.103
Falandization was coined after the strategic interpretations offered by
Lech Falandysz, the major legal advisor to Lech Wałęsa, the first president in
Poland after 1989. President Wałęsa was in office during 1990 and 1995.
During his term, his popular support, as well as political coalition, diminished
quickly. To consolidate his own power, he relied heavily on strategic
interpretations offered by Minister Falandysz who believed that, during the
early stages of democratization, the President should expand the scope of his
power by informal action, like legal interpretation.104 In a well-known case
over the abonnement two appointments to the National Broadcasting Council
(Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji, KRRiT, “NBC”), Mr. Falandysz argued
that the President enjoyed the power to withdraw his appointments, since he
Id. at 19; see also Prezydent Andrzej Duda: niepodległość jest zobowiązaniem dla wszystkich
Polaków [President Andrzej Duda: Independence is a Commitment for All Poles], POLSKIE RADIO SA (Nov.
11, 2015), https://www.polskieradio.pl/7/129/Artykul/1543232,Prezydent-Andrzej-Duda-niepodlegloscjest-zobowiazaniem-dla-wszystkich-Polakow; Christian Davies, Poland is ‘On Road to Autocracy’, Says
Constitutional
Court
President,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
18,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/18/poland-is-on-road-to-autocracy-says-high-court-president.
103
According to Wiktor Osiatynski, “to falandize means to stretch the law beyond its intentions and
limits in order to foster the interests and power of an institution.” See Wiktor Osiatynski, The Constitutional
Honeymoon Is Over: The Paradoxes of Post-Communist Constitution Making, in THE PARADOXES OF
UNINTENTIONAL CONSEQUENCES 143–63 (Lord Dahrendorf et al. eds., 2001). See also ARTUR OLECHNO,
ABUSE OF LAW BY CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE HEADS OF STATES (U. of Bialystok),
https://is.muni.cz/do/law/1237864/web/principles/pdf/olechno.pdf.
104
WOJCIECH ROSZKOWSKI & JAN KOFMAN, BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 2833 (Wojciech Roszkowski & Jan Kofman eds., 2008).
102

April 2019

Unenumerated Power

423

had the power to appoint.105 Nevertheless, there is no constitutional provision
granting him the power to dismiss the board members of NBC. Falandysz
argued that, if the language of the Constitution is silent, President Wałęsa may
interpret the Constitution to fulfill his constitutional duty.
The case of NBC was fiercely debated in Poland. Ultimately, the
Constitutional Tribunal reached its conclusion in the following ruling:
According to the Constitutional Tribunal, when the norms are
vague and unclear about competence (/authority), the
constitutional principle of legitimacy along with the principle of
democratic state of law have explicitly indicated that the
competence (/authority) cannot be alleged or made up, if the
legislators did not express their intention clearly. . . . In reference
to the non-expressed competences, the statute must always be
interpreted based on the text, and no other ways of interpretation
is permitted.106
This decision of the Constitutional Tribunal set up the final standard of
interpreting competence norms. In fact, the conflict between the President and
the Sejm was the deciding factor in this ruling. Wałęsa was in office until 1995,
two years before the enactment of the current Constitution. Therefore, his
presidency looked very different from the ones of his successors. First, the
power of the President flowed from the amended Constitution of People’s
Republic of Poland of 1952,107 and then from the so-called Small Constitution
of 1992. 108 Both documents provided an institutional design for the
President’s role, which was very different from the previously existing one.
The power of the President was much broader, though not a typical
presidential system. The post-1989 Sejm was very outspoken and became the
voice of the nation. This competition led to many conflicts between the
President and the Sejm, or even the whole government. President Lech Wałęsa,
therefore, had strong incentives to strengthen his presidential power.
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Drawing from the experience of Lech Wałęsa’s overreaching power
and his constant conflicts with the Sejm, the drafters of the 1997 Constitution
decided to significantly limit the power of the President and to adopt the
parliamentary system, saying goodbye to the semi-presidential system. 109
Unfortunately, this did not mean that falandization disappeared. In fact, it
appears to be endemic. During the PiS administration, Prime Minister Szydło
decided not to promulgate the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal, even
though there was no statute authorizing her the power to withhold the
publication of constitutional judgment.110
The trickiest logic about falandization is that it is not something
expressly prohibited by the law, but that it is also not something that is
permitted by the law. As such, it always justified the President’s action as
being “not literally forbidden by law expressly.” One recent example of
falandization by the President is the extremely controversial change in the Act
Regarding the Institute of the National Remembrance. The bill caused
tensions between Polish-Israeli and Polish-American relations. The President
had three options: he could have either signed the bill into law, referred it to
the Constitutional Tribunal (so-called “preventive control”), or returned it
to the Sejm. Surprisingly, he decided to sign the bill and send it to the
Constitutional Tribunal.111 This is a very confusing presidential action. On the
one hand, if the President has any doubt concerning the bill, he may refuse to
sign on it and simply send it to the Constitutional Tribunal. He cannot have it
both ways. By signing the bill, the President affirmed that the bill was
consistent with the Constitution. However, signing the bill and immediately
sending it to the Constitutional Tribunal created a dubious decision on the
constitutionality of the regarding law, which might have violated his
fundamental duty as the guardian of the Constitution. 112 There was no
constitutional provision or statute that prohibited such a presidential action,
though many lawyers in Poland were convinced that the President had twisted
his duty too much.
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PLENARY POWER OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

Having illustrated the different types of unenumerated executive
powers with three case-studies, we will now discuss the nature and pathology
of the global phenomenon in this section. The first and foremost issue we have
to distinguish is whether or not the unenumerated powers are constitutional
power. If they are not, there is no need to discuss any normative implication
of this type of power. Then, the exercise of unenumerated powers would be a
question of de facto power, which might or might not violate the basic
requirements of constitutionalism. If they are constitutional, what is the
difference between unenumerated powers and enumerated ones? Is it the
cause of democratic failure? Let us start with the nature of unenumerated
powers. As shown in the three cases, all the “powers” exercised by the
presidents or prime ministers are not clearly defined in their constitutions.
However, are those powers unconstitutional? American constitutional debates
over the scope of Article II power provide some clues to navigate this thorny
question. Louis Fisher, one of the authorities of separation of powers in the
United States, argues that all three powers in the American Constitution have
implied powers, which are “powers that can be reasonably drawn from express
powers.”113 He argues that the removal power, for example, which is not listed
in Article II, can be construed from the Take Care clause of Article II.
Therefore, it is hard to argue that powers that are implied and unenumerated
in the Constitution are unconstitutional. Nevertheless, even though he
supports the idea of implied powers, Fisher opposes the notion of inherent
powers (or the sole-organ doctrine) articulated by Justice Sutherland in his
opinion for Curtiss-Wright. 114 According to Justice Sutherland, in the
domestic context, powers that have not been written in the Constitution are
left for local states, so there is no implied power reserved for the federal
government.115 However, in the realm of international relations, the President
enjoys sole and independent power, which does not require legislative
delegation, since the sovereignty shall be one on the external issues.116 This is
113
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the inherent power of the President, which enables him or her to gain
preemptive power in the realm of foreign affairs. Fisher criticizes the idea of
“inherent power” on the grounds that it would grant presidents immense
power without any sensible limitation. However, “implied powers,” according
to him, have to be affiliated with discernible constitutional authority of the
President listed in the Constitution.
The contrast between domestic and international issues has become less
and less apparent. For example, the president may take unilateral actions, like
memoranda or executive orders, to implement environmental, anti-terrorism,
or immigration policies, which substantially impact foreign affairs. Therefore,
it is implausible to argue that the president enjoys inherent powers in the
terrain of international relations but not in the domestic context. Modern
American presidents have frequently relied upon their inherent powers to
make domestic policies. 117 One prominent example is President Truman’s
executive order to seize the nation’s steel industry in the wake of Korean
War.118 However, according to Louis Fisher, President Truman appealed to
both enumerated and implied powers, rather than his inherent powers, in his
order to seize the steel industry.119
One should not be puzzled by this scholarly taxonomy. To make the
comparison clearer, the inherent power defined by Louis Fisher is very similar
to William Blackstone’s definition of the King’s prerogative as “those rights
and capacities which the king enjoys alone.” 120In the modern context, Fisher
further distinguished inherent power from the prerogative power. According
to him, “[u]nder inherent power, the President claims authority to act
independently without any interference from the other branches,” while
“[p]rerogative accepts that the executive may take the initiative, but only with
the understanding that the legislative branch must act later.”121 By “inherent
power,” Fisher means the powers directly derived from the position of the
chief executive. Those powers that can find textual (enumerated) or
intentional (implied) basis in the constitution would not be regarded as
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inherent powers. To Fisher, the assertion of inherent powers leads to the abuse
of powers, since it essentially gives a blank check to the presidents.122
This article has highlighted some actions of chief executives in Japan,
Poland, and Taiwan as an exercise of “unenumerated powers,” rather than
implied or inherent powers. Unenumerated powers are not clearly defined in
the constitutions but are directly or indirectly pertinent to the constitutional
authority of the chief executive, which is clearly defined in the constitution.
In this sense, my use of unenumerated powers is very close to Fisher’s implied
power. For example, the personnel power in Japan does not belong to the
Prime Minister but to the cabinet.123 However, according to Article 68, the
Prime Minister has the power to appoint the Ministers of State. The Prime
Minister controls members of the cabinet and, therefore, may extend his
power through the Cabinet’s Personnel Office to control the mid-level
bureaucrats in the government. Similarly, the President in Taiwan enjoys
constitutional power to coordinate different branches on controversial issues.
Therefore, President Ma claimed that he was legally permitted to listen to the
report from the Attorney General and to command him to investigate the case
of the Speaker’s scandal. In this sense, he placed the Attorney General under
his control and cemented the foundation of his unitary executive power. For
Poland, when President Wałęsa decided to withdraw his appointments to the
NBC, he twisted the language of the Small Constitution to expand his own
power. But the “withdrawal” was justified by the Polish President’s power to
appoint, even though the language of the Small Constitution did not mention
“withdrawal.” These are clearly the implied powers enjoyed by the chief
executives to expand their original authority.
To makes things more complicated, murkier issues—like the cases of
Mr. Abe’s special advisor, i.e., the shadow warrior in Japan, and Mr.
Kaczyński, the puppet controller in Poland—are even more difficult to
characterize and regulate under the formal model of separation of powers.
“A constitution safeguards individual rights and liberties by specifying and limiting government.
Express and implied powers serve that purpose. Inherent powers invite claims of power that have no limits,
other than those voluntarily accepted by the President. What ‘inheres’ in the President? The word ‘inherent’
is sometimes cross-referenced to ‘intrinsic,’ which can be something ‘belonging to the essential nature or
construction of a thing.’ What is in the ‘nature’ of a political office? Nebulous words and concepts invite
political abuse and unconstitutional actions. They threaten individual liberties. Presidents who asset inherent
powers move the nation from one of limited powers to boundless and ill-defined authority, undermining
republican government, the doctrine of separation of powers, and the system of checks and balance.” See
FISHER supra note 1133, at 70.
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They are exercising political powers but are not held accountable by any
constitutional mechanism. These powers are coupled with constitutional
authority of the “master” (in Japan) or the “puppets” (in Poland). Theolitical
party becomes the channel to negotiate the two powers, constitutional and
political, and to fuse the two powers into one. For example, Mr. Ma of Taiwan
used his party leadership to remove Speaker Wang’s membership so that he
would be disqualified as a member of the parliament. The political powers
facilitate or support the expanding constitutional authority of the chief
executive, so it is hard to draw a line between political power and
constitutional power after the fusion of presidential powers.
After examining the cases of non-statutory executive powers in the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel, Margit Cohn cogently argues,
“the incompleteness of law, supplemented by the political expediency of
reliance on non-statutory rules—especially when the executive is challenged
by a relatively hostile legislature—virtually guarantees their use.”124 It is the
vagueness and indeterminacy in statutes or constitutional provisions that gives
the chief executives opportunities to reinterpret the language of the
constitution and to expand the scope of unenumerated powers. Falandization
is one example; there are many cases of unilateral executive action involved
with interpretation. Once the chief executives find a loophole in the
constitutional text, they may grasp the chance to generate “unenumerated”
powers. Once there is one unenumerated power, there probably will be a
second, third, and many unenumerated powers created by the presidents. This
demonstrates the so- called “concept creep,” which makes the boundary of
concept, e.g., the personnel power, blurry and fuzzy.125 By way of creeping,
the chief executive not only expands his or her “unenumerated” powers, but
also makes the executive the prime player in the constitutional arena. To avoid
a constitutional crisis, constitutional systems around the globe should pay
close attention to the gradual epidemic engendered by the creep of
unenumerated powers.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Unenumerated powers are flexible and probably impossible to
encompass under a fixed, singular, or operational definition. Moreover, they
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are coupled with political control or party discipline, which is not the
traditional focus of the constitution. In this article, I attempt to delineate the
metamorphosis of informal powers enjoyed by the chief executive and
describe it as unenumerated powers. I argue that there are powers, either
political or constitutional, pertinent to the chief executive’s constitutional
authority that are not clearly and expressly defined in the constitution. The
exercise of unenumerated powers is not so vicious, but how to hold them
accountable is the key question. Legal scholars need to know more about the
intersection of political powers and constitutional authority.
The chief executives need unenumerated powers to facilitate their
decision-making power. Especially in the age of the administrative state,
national leaders have to satisfy all kinds of practical needs for the populace.
Institutionally speaking, it is the court that should confine the scope of
unenumerated powers. However, owing to the dichotomy of politics and law,
courts are very rarely willing to deal with the pathology of unenumerated
powers. Therefore, the politician’s immediate goal after winning the elections
is to tame the judiciary or the branch in charge of constitutional interpretation,
like the Legislation Bureau in Japan or the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland.
This article argues that, once the chief executive gains the primary authority
in interpreting the constitution or statutes with constitutional nature, the
process of “concept creep” would help the chief executives to expand their
constitutional authority and turn the country into a state of executive primacy.
This is the epidemic plagued which plagues twenty-first century
constitutionalism and may dangerously lead to the resurgence of
authoritarianism.
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